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AGRICULTURE'S ABILITY TO STORE CARBON IN THE SOIL COULD PROVIDE ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS AND POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL INCOME FOR 
FARMERS. BUT WILL ONE NATION'S MULTIFUNCTION BE ANOTHER'S AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDY? 
ar 
The next big cash crop? 
BY HONGLI FENG, JINHUA ZHAO, AND CATHERINE L. KLING 
W th the release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) revised forecast predict-ing even greater global warming effects than previ-
ously believed, the interest in methods to reduce the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) is almost certain to 
grow. Agriculture is unique in that it has the potential to gener-
ate greenhouse gases (Schneider and McCarl, 1999), as well as to 
sequester (or store) large amounts of carbon and other 
greenh ouse gases in its soil (Lal et al., 1998). The activities that 
may enhance the storage of carbon in agricultural soils include 
planting trees, converting from conventional to conservation 
tillage, adopting improved cropping systems, converting to 
perennial crops, and restoration of weclands, among others. 
Experts estimate cropland in the United States has the 
potential to sequester 75-208 million metric tons of carbon 
equivalence per year (MMTC/yr). On average, this is about 8 
percent of total U.S. emissions of GHGs or 24 percent of the 
U.S. emission reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Lal et al.) . Figure 1 shows the distribution of carbon sequestra-
tion potential across different agricultural practices. Clearly, 
conservation tillage and residue management improvement have 
the most potential to sequester carbon in agricultural soil. 
Paustian et al. (2000) estimate that, in Iowa, for a corn-soy-
bean rotation, conversion from conventional to no-till could 
increase carbon storage rates by about 550 kilograms per 
hectare per year (Figure 2); for land enrolled in the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP), the rates range about 1500 
kg/ha/yr (Figure 3). At an assumed payment rate of $20 per 
ton, the total potential revenue that C sequestration might 
bring to Iowa farmers is more than $100 million per year. 
Pautsch et al. (2001) also suggest that the income potential for 
Iowa farmers is substantial. Antle et al. (1999,2000) provide 
similar estimates for Montana: at $30 per ton, carbon sequestra-
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tion could provide $13.5 million per year for 20 years to Mon-
tana grain producers willing to swi tch from a crop/fallow to a 
continuous cropping system. 
Thus, the limited available evidence suggests that U.S. farm-
ers might substantially profit from a system that pays them for 
storing carbon in their soils, assuming payment rates similar to 
those discussed above. Moreover, practices that sequester carbon 
do more than mitigate greenhouse gas effects. By adopting car-
bon-enhancing activities, soil productivity, water and air qual-
ity, and wildlife habitats are all enhanced. 
It Plays in Kyoto, But What About Kansas? 
Despi te the interest jn carbon markets or programs that 
would reward agriculture for storing carbon, there are still 
substantive questions about how to design such mechanisms 
that wo uld meet this task and be generally acceptable to the 
international community. Under the Kyoto Protocol , carbon 
sequeste red through forestry is exp licicly allowed. However, no 
role currently exists for agricultural soils . Clouding the issue 
further, President Bush in early 2001 announced that the U.S. 
would withdraw from the Kyoto regime. That issue aside, the 
language of the protocol clearly allows for the future admis-
sion of agricultural soil sinks. However, member countri es are 
not likely to ratify agriculture's inclusion until key implemen-
tation issues are reso lved. 
One of the most significant issues is the fact that, unlike 
reductions in emissions, carbon sinks may only temporarily 
keep carbon out of the atmosphere. This characteristic of sinks 
applies to all forms, including forestry, but is likely to be espe-
cially problematic in the case of agriculture as annual changes in 
land use and management can have significan t effects on carbon 
storage. For example, switching production practices from con-
ventional to reduced tillage may seques ter a significant amount 
This is a carbon sink: Farming practices such as no-till have 
the potential to tie up large amounts of carbon in the soil. 
This is not a carbon sink: Traditional mqldboard plow 
practices not only do not sequester carbon in the soil , 
they release any previously sequestered carbon. 
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of carbon over several years . However, if 
the farmer reverts to conventional t·illage, 
nearly all of the stored carbon will be 
released immediately. 
All Sinks Are Temporary 
Agricultural sinks may be intention-
ally temporary or unintentionally so. For 
example, a farmer may sign a contract 
with a broker to adopt conservation 
tillage practices in exchange for an 
annual payment for a fixed number of 
years. In such a case, the carbon seques-
tration services provided by the sink are 
temporary, at least potentially so. 
Even if both parties anticipate 
that the contract could be 
extended or renegotiated at its 
term, there is still the very real 
possibility that the farmer will 
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It is important to note that in most 
situations, even temporary sinks will 
have positive value, albeit not as great as 
that associated with permanent reduc-
tions or abatement. This occurs because 
global warming damage is reduced while 
the carbon is stored and roughly returns 
to its former level upon release, generat-
ing a net reduction in damage. 
Taking Carbon to Market: First, You 
Need A Market 
Until policy mechanisms that prop-
erly account for the potentially tempo-
rary nature of sinks are developed, it is 
unlikely that agricultural carbon seques-
tration will gain widespread acceptance. 
We introduce and discuss three such 
mechanisms - a Pay-As-You-Go 
(PAYG) System, a Variable Length Con-
tract (VLC) System, and a Carbon 
Annuity Account (CAA) System. These 
mechanisms could be implemented in 
the context of either a private trading 
market or a government program (such 
as green payments) , but we will explain 
them in the context of a well-functioning 
external carbon market that determines 
the price of carbon abatement. 
Figure 1: Carbon Sequestration Potential of Different 
Improved Practices on U.S. Cropland 
That is, the price for one unit 
of carbon credit is the price 
associated with one unit of per-
manent carbon reduction. Irrigation/Water 
Management 
6% 
Land Use Change 
7% 
choose not to do so. Second, 
unanticipated events may cause 
the early release of carbon. In the 
case of forestry, a fire may be the 
Land Restor<lltion Conservation Tillage 
and Residue 
The PAYG system applies 
the price of one full credit for 
each unit of carbon released or 
sequestrated, with no consider-
ation given to the permanence 
issue. However, as the name 
suggests, while a sink owner 
gets rewarded a full credit when 
she removes one unit of carbon 
cause. In the case of agriculture, 
changes in crop or input prices 
may induce the farmer to break 
the contract. 
Improved Cropping 
Systems 
25% 
Management 
49% 
Source: Lal et aI., 1998, page 84. 
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from the atmosphere, she wili also have 
to pay a full credit when she releases the 
sequestered carbon. 
In rhe VLC system, in anticipation of 
the non-permanence of seques tered car-
bon, temporary carbon sequestration will 
be paid at a discounted rate. The 
discount wili, among other things, 
depend on how long sequestered carbon 
will be kept out of the atmosphere. 
In the CAA system, rhe generator! 
maintainer of a sink is paid rhe full car-
bon price, and payment is put direcrly 
into an annuity account. As long as the 
sink remains in place, rhe owner can 
access rhe earnings of the ann uity 
account, but not rhe principal . The prin-
cipal is recovered by the ongoing permit 
price if and when the carbon is released. 
If the sink remains permanently, the 
sink owner eventually earns all of rhe 
interest payments, the discounted pres-
ent value of which equals the principal 
itself - the permanent permit price. 
Merits and Pitfalls of the Mechanisms 
Wirh perfect foresight of future car-
bon permit prices, each of the three sys-
tems provides an economically efficient 
solution to the non-permanent nature of 
agricultural carbon sequestration (Feng, 
Zhao, and Kling, 2000). However, they 
differ considerably in practice, particu-
larly regarding permit price uncertainty. 
Other factors affecting implementation 
are transaction cos ts, default of payment, 
measurement and veriE.cation, and exist-
ing farm programs. 
PAYG. Under PAYG, forcing farmers 
to pay back the full permit price upon 
carbon release may be difficult, and even 
infeasible, when farm income is low 
(which is also when farmers have more 
incentive to reverse sequestration to 
boost income from crop production). 
Facing the likelihood of farmer default, 
other parties in rhe private sector may 
not wish to enforce the payback, leaving 
the government as the only possible 
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party to transact directly with farmers . 
The possibility of default may be even 
higher, given rhe history of farm 
programs in the U.S. 
If rhe system is strictly enforced, risk 
averse farmers may be reluctant to par-
ticipate given rhe possibili ty of higher 
future prices. Overall, the PAYG system 
is unlikely,to be feas ible. 
VLC. The VLC system greatly reduces 
rhe likelihood of default because for rhe 
most part, it is the brokers who will face 
permit price uncertain ty. Given that pri-
Figure 2. Increase in Iowa Soil Storage 
Rates with Conversion of Conventional-
Till Corn/Soybeans to No-Till 
Source: Paustian et al.. 2000 
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Figure 3. Increase in Iowa Soil Storage 
Rates with Conservation Reserve Program 
Source: Paustian et aI., 2000 
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vate brokers have already demonstrated 
interest in contracting for carbon storage 
services (Economist), this approach may 
be quite feasible. The major challenge 
facing VLC is likely to be transaction 
and administrative COSts: particularly, in 
auditing brokers who contract with a 
large number of farmers and offer many 
kinds of contracts. 
Further, enforcing and managing 
these contracts may also incur significant 
transaction costs. To cover these transac-
tion costs, brokers will have to reduce 
carbon sequestration payments, which in 
turn will reduce farmer participation. 
Alternatively, governments may choose 
to offer such contracts. 
CAA_ Compared with PAYG, the 
CAA system reduces the possibility of 
farmer default since rhey only have to 
pay back the difference between permit 
prices if the permit price is higher when 
carbon is released. Unlike VLC, farmers 
rather brokers face the risk of higher per-
mit prices in the future, and extreme 
volatili ty of prices may discourage par tic-
ipati0n. However, farmers also have the 
flexibility in this system of leaving rhe 
program when permit prices are low. If 
the accounts are offered as part of a gov-
ernment program, rhey could be admin-
istered in conjunction wirh existing con-
servation programs, such as CRP. T hus 
the institutional setting for CAA already 
exists, in a sense, likely facilitating its 
implementation (the orher two mecha-
nisms may be amenable to joint imple-
mentation as well). 
Finally, common to all three systems 
are the issues of effective monitoring and 
enforcement, agreement on a baseline for 
measurement, and potential "leakage" 
(or substitution of emissions from one 
location to another). Despite rhese con-
cerns, there is ample reason to be opti-
mistic that effective market mechanisms 
or government programs can be devised 
to include agricultural soils in an effec-
tive greenhouse gas policy. 
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3 systems 
Pay-As-YOU-GO (PAYG) 
Suppose a farmer would like to enter 
into a contract to sequester carbon by 
adopting conservation tillage practices; 
however, she is not willing to commit to 
that practice indefinitely, but only for five 
years. In each year that she practices con-
servation tillage her land sequesters 1000 
metric tons of carbon. Thus, if she were to 
revert to conventional till in the sixth year, 
she would release the 5000 tons of carbon 
she would have accumulated in her soils. We 
will use this example farmer to explain the 
operation of the three systems. 
Under the PAVG system, the farmer 
would sell emission credits based on a per-
manent reduction of carbon. Thus, for the 
first five years, the farmer could sell 1,000 
credits each at the full price of permanent 
reductions. However, in the sixth year, she 
would be required to purchase carbon cred-
its from the market at the going price to 
cover her emissions (5,000 total). For par-
ties who transact with the farmer, there is 
no complication. They pay full price for the 
credits they buy, and can treat them the 
same as if the credits were from emission 
reductions. Such a system is efficient and 
easy to understand. 
Even though a PAVG system functions 
similarly to a standard trading system, it 
could require additional accounting of car-
bon that is kept in the farmer's land: the 
farmer's credit balance changes whenever 
she sequesters or releases carbon and she is 
paid or charged accordingly. Thus, an 
agency, whether private or public, must be 
established to monitor these changes. Such 
an agency would be needed even in a stan-
dard permit trading market. The only differ-
ence is that here we will also have seques-
tration, that is, negative emissions. 
Variable Length Contract (VLC) 
This system might evolve through inde-
pendent broker arrangements. Again, the 
farmer is interested in storing carbon for 
five years. If a broker buys permits from 
sink sources and sells them to emitters, the 
broker must contract with sink sources to 
achieve a permanent reduction in carbon. 
The broker could accomplish this by pur-
chasing a contract with the above farmer to 
adopt conservation tillage for the first five 
years, and then contracting with another 
farmer to plant trees beginning in year six 
for a certain number of years, and so on. In 
each period, the broker might offer farm-
ers a menu of prices associated with differ-
ent contract lengths. The institutional 
structure of this system can be depicted as: 
Farmers 
Contracts 
Carbon 
Brokers 
Carbon 
Market 
The prices of contracts with different 
lengths are determined by the market. If 
there are no arbitrage opportunities in 
emission and contract trading, the prices 
will be efficient, and will be fractions of the 
permanent price depending on the con-
tract lengths. 
The carbon broker functions as an 
aggregator, converting temporary carbon 
reductions into permanent ones. In addi-
tion, brokers aggregate small reductions 
by individual farmers into large volumes 
more suited to the trading needs of indus-
trial firms. 
Carbon Annuity Account (CAA) 
As for the farmer in the other two 
examples, an annuity account would be 
opened for her in the first year. In each of 
the first five years, the value of 1,000 tons 
of carbon would be deposited into the 
account. The farmer would collect earnings 
on this account for these years. However, in 
the sixth year when the carbon is released, 
the on-going value of 5,000 tons of carbon 
would be deducted from the account. 
The payment deposited in the annuity 
account works as a "bond" - with the 
money in the account, the farmer is discour-
aged from releasing her stored carbon, and 
if she releases it, it is guaranteed that she 
will be able to pay at least partly for the 
released carbon. Except for this "bond-like" 
property, the CAA is the same as the PAVG. 
